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An Efficient Privacy-Preserving
Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme for
Edge-Assisted Internet of Drones
Prosanta Gope, Member, IEEE and Biplab Sikdar, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—There has been a a significant increase in the
popularity of using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), popularly
known as drones, in several applications. In many application
scenarios, UAVs are deployed in missions where sensitive data
is collected, such as monitoring critical infrastructure, industrial
facilities, crops, and public safety. Due to the sensitive and/or
safety critical nature of the data collected in these applications,
it is imperative to consider the security and privacy aspects of
the UAVs used in these scenarios. In this article, we propose
an efficient privacy aware authenticated key agreement scheme
for edge-assisted UAVs (Internet of Drones). Unlike the existing
security solutions for UAVs, the proposed scheme does not need
to store any secret keys in the devices but still can provide the
desired security features. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work where physical security of the UAV has been taken into
account. The proposed system allows third-party communication
and mobile edge computing service providers to authenticate
the UAVs without any loss of provacy and outperforms existing
methods in terms of computational complexity.
Index Terms—Internet of Drones, Mutual Authentication, Dou-
ble PUF, Computational Efficiency, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
W
ITH the recent development in aviation technologies,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), popularly known as
drones, have gained significant attention in both academia and
industry. Nowadays, drones are being used for various appli-
cations that include military, public safety and first responses,
surveillance and monitoring of industrial, agricultural and
infrastructural facilities, telecommunications, and delivery of
medical supplies, among others [1-4]. According to [5], there
will be 2.7 million small-scale UAVs by 2020 and they will
be used to launch a wide-range of services. UAVs typically
occupy the low altitude airspace and this airspace is expected
to get increasingly densely occupied. Therefore, connecting
UAVs through the Internet of Connected Drones (IoD) can
ensure significant benefits in traffic management and also in
the quality of service for the UAVs. With such an IoD, UAVs
will be able to make accurate and efficient flying strategies
by exchanging traffic and airspace information between each
others via the IoD.
Despite its numerous benefits, security and privacy are
still major concerns in IoD environments. In many UAV
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applications, the UAV communication may contain sensitive
information such as location, flying patterns, etc. Since IoD
uses the public and open-access communication networks that
can be exposed to potential adversaries, security issues such as
authentication, privacy, and secure data outsourcing are some
of the main concerns in IoD environments. While there have
been some recent efforts at addressing these security issues,
much of the work is still at a preliminary stage and aimed at
providing high-level overviews without detailed construction
of protocols [6-11].
Two of the major security concerns with IoD communica-
tions are authentication and privacy. The use of drones for
sensitive applications makes them attractive targets for adver-
saries. In addition to the data that is collected by the drones,
the identity of the drones and their geographical location
(i.e., flight path) may also be targeted by the adversaries to
gain confidential information related to use of drones and the
facilities that they are monitoring. Further, in many applica-
tions, drones may have to interact with third-party services
such as telecommunication service providers and mobile edge
computing (MEC) services to offload and process their data in
real-time [21-22] . Usually, MEC can provide cloud computing
capabilities and IT service environment at the edge of the
network, within the Radio Access Network (RAN) and in
close proximity to mobile subscribers. Compared with cloud
computing, MEC significantly reduces the network latency to
its mobile subscribers, which hence ensures highly efficient
network operation and service delivery, and offer an improved
user experience. Thus, all parties involved in the commu-
nication to and from the drones have to be authenticated,
and in the presence of third party MEC and communication
service providers, drones should be protected against attacks
on their privacy that can leak sensitive information about them.
This paper addresses this problem and proposes a privacy-
preserving authentication and key agreement mechanism for
use with drones that use third party communication and MEC
services.
In order to design an effective authentication framework for
IoD with privacy protection, the following challenges need to
be overcome simultaneously. First, given the fact that com-
munication in IoD may contain time-sensitive, safety critical
traffic information, the real-time authentication mechanism
designed for IoD should be as efficient as possible. Also,
since small-scale UAVs are usually resource constrained in
terms of computation and energy, the design of authentica-
tion should only involve lightweight operations. Second, the
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proposed framework needs to prevent malicious adversaries
from learning the true identity of any valid UAV. However,
when traffic accidents or certain misbehavior occur, it should
be possible, if necessary, to conditionally reveal the identity of
an UAV to legal authorities. Thus, we refer to such a privacy
protection as conditional privacy as introduced in [16].
In this paper, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving
authentication scheme for IoD-based UAV environments. Al-
though several authentication schemes for drones have been
proposed in literature, these schemes require the devices (such
as UAVs) to store the security credentials (such as secret
key), which could be exposed through various attacks (e.g., if
the drone is physically captured by the adversary or through
intelligent side channel attacks). This paper seeks to address
this key security issue in IoD environments. One of the notable
properties of the proposed scheme is that it does not require an
UAV to store any secret key but it can still ensure higher level
security. Towards this end, the proposed mechanism utilizes
the concept of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to
facilitate high levels of security while simultaneously mini-
mizing the computational resource requirement in each device.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper which has
considered physical security of the UAVs.
The key contributions of the paper are as follows:
• A new prototype model for edge-assisted Internet of
Drones, which allows an UAV to collect information
from the ground-level and constantly send updates to the
control center with the help of a MEC or communication
service operated by a third-party company, where service
rate and effectiveness of a service provider may vary
based on the location and other factors.
• A novel double-PUF-based privacy-preserving authen-
ticated key agreement protocol that may be used by
the third-party service provider to verify the legitimacy
of an UAV (without compromising its privacy), before
receiving services to the UAV.
• A comparative study of the proposed scheme with re-
spect to a closely related recently proposed authentica-
tion scheme for IoD. Our results demonstrate that the
proposed scheme is secure and computationally more
efficient as compared to the existing schemes.
The remainder of this paper has been organized as follows.
Section II presents an overview of related work, and the
system and adversary models are presented in Section III. The
proposed scheme is presented in Section IV. Security analysis
of the proposed scheme is presented in Section V. A discussion
on the performance of the proposed scheme is presented in
Section VI. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VII. The
symbols and cryptographic functions of the proposed scheme
are defined in Table I.
II. RELATED WORK
Issues related to security and privacy in IoD environments
have received increasing attention in recent years. High-level
overviews of security and privacy issues in IoD have been
identified and presented in [6-11], and [15]. However, the ma-
jority of the work in this area focuses on the general security
Table I
SYMBOLS AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTION
Symbol Definition
IDu Identity of the MU
PID iu i-th Pseudo identity of UAV
CRP(C, R) Challenge-Response pair
SK Session Key
Pu(·) Physically uncloneable function
h(·) One-way hash function
⊕ Exclusive-OR operation
|| Concatenation operation
issues, without providing any concrete security solutions for
IoD environments. For instance, in [7], the authors have mainly
tried to show how to efficiently and effectively organize IoD.
On the other hand, in [8], the authors have pointed out some
security issues such as authentication, privacy leakage, secure
data outsourcing, in IoD. However, no detailed construction
of protocols or solutions are proposed to address these issues.
While [9] suggested several potential solutions for enhancing
the security of IoD, these are high-level ideas. For example,
the authors highlight the need for mutual authentication for
secure communication without providing any protocol level
description.
There have been some recent works on developing authenti-
cation mechanisms for IoD environments. In [15], the authors
proposed a privacy preserving authentication framework for
IoD by using a certificate-based digital signature scheme.
However, the proposed solution does not provide security
against location threats as well as security against any physical
attacks. In [16], Zhang et al. proposed a lightweight authenti-
cation scheme for IoD. However, after a detailed investigation,
we found that the proposed authentication protocol is insecure
against forgery attacks, where an attacker can intercept the first
message communicated between user Ui and the control server
(CS). The attacker can then change the timestamp ST1, but
the CS cannot identify that. Besides, in the protocol proposed
[16], the drone needs to store certain security credentials for
participating in the authentication protocol. Thus, if an attacker
succeeds to physically capture the drone, then he/she can ac-
cess the device’s memory or subject it to side-channel attacks
to get the stored credentials. Consequently, the attacker can
compromise the drone (i.e., change the settings) but neither the
CS nor Ui will be able to identify that. The protocol proposed
in [17] is also vulnerable to similar security threats and issues.
In addition, since the schemes proposed in [15-17] are based
on the use of timestamps, they also suffer from the global-
time-synchronization problem. Apart from [15-17], recently
a few more interesting IoD-based authentication schemes [18-
20] have been proposed in the literature. Unfortunately, similar
to [15-17], the protocols presented in [18-20] also suffer from
the same issue, i.e., those resulting from the physical security
of the UAVs.
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III. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
A. System Model
Figure 1 shows the system model considered in this paper,
in which we consider three major participants: a set of UAVs, a
set of communication infrastructure or mobile edge computing
operators [12], and a UAV service provider (USP) or the
organization that owns the UAVs. Note that the communi-
cation/MEC operators are companies that are different from
the USP and specialize in providing connectivity, real-time
analytics, and data processing support to the UAVs. For
simplicity, we refer to these third-party communication service
providers as well as mobile edge computing service providers
as “MEC operators”. There are two major entities in an USP:
control and monitoring center (CMC), and cloud data center
(CDC). All UAVs are equipped with two PUFs [13] and
also integrated with other services such as global positioning
system (GPS), wireless communication interface, etc.
In order to embark on a mission and be operational, each
UAV first needs to register with the USP. Similarly, each MEC
operator is required to register with the USP as well and they
communicate with the USP via a secure channel. Each UAV is
required to send its field data to the USP via a MEC operator.
The MEC operators have enough computational capability to
support both the UAV and the USP to establish a session key
for facilitating secure communication. Since the operational
region of the UAVs may span large geographical areas, the area
over which a MEC operator provides its service is divided into
several smaller regions. Also, it is possible that a single MEC
operator does not provide coverage over all regions of interest
for a USP. Thus, a USP may rely on more than one MEC
operator for its operation. Also, in places with more than one
MEC operator, the service rate and effectiveness of each MEC
operator may vary based on the location and other factors.
For instance, the service rate provided by the MEC operator
in region Y (RegY in Fig. 1) could be higher than that in
region X (RegX in Fig. 1). Thus, the UAVs should be capable
of authenticating with multiple MEC operators without any
compromise in their privacy.
B. Adversary Model
In our system model, the UAVs mainly use public network
based communication. Consequently, there is a possibility of
various attacks by a wide range of adversaries. In this paper,
we consider the following security and privacy threats:
• Authentication Threat: Before obtaining any field data
of a particular region from a UAV and establishing a
secure session key, the USP needs to authenticate the
UAV. In this context, the MEC operators help them in
exchanging their messages. However, in our threat model
we consider the MEC operator as a semi-honest adver-
sary, who may try to modify the messages exchanged
between the participants (UAV and USP). Besides, since
the authentication process will also be carried out through
an insecure public channel, any external adversary can
modify the messages received/sent by the UAV.
• Privacy Threat: The identity of the UAV should be
known only to the USP. Thus, the real identity of the
UAV should be kept hidden from the MEC operator.
Here, the threat considered is that the MEC operator may
try to trace the flight-path of the UAV as it moves from
one region to another. In addition, any outside adversary
(eavesdropper) also should not be able to identify the
UAV and trace the UAV’s trajectory.
• Location Threat: Based on the system model presented
earlier (with different service quality in different regions),
a dishonest MEC operator may also falsify its signal to
a UAV, in order to charge higher prices for its service.
Therefore, the USP also needs to validate the location in-
formation of the UAVs using their location area identifier
(LAI).
• Session-key Security Threat: After a successful authen-
tication, an UAV and the USP need to establish a secure
session key that will be used for secure communication
between the USP and the UAV. The protocol for setting
up the key should also support the property of backward
secrecy for the session key (i.e., if the session key
gets leaked for a given session, the session keys of the
previous sessions should not get compromised).
• Physical Security Threat: Since UAVs are often used
for military, surveillance, and monitoring purposes, there
is a possibly that an attacker may attempt to physically
capture a UAV. Additionally, it is also possible that an
UAV involved in an accident is found and taken over by
the adversary. Physical access to the UAV may allow the
adversary to subject it to a range of attacks to gain access
to the stored data in the UAV. In addition, the adversary
may also get access to security credentials stored in the
UAV’s memory and then use it disclose any encrypted
data or authenticate with the USP.
IV. PROPOSED DOUBLE-PUF-BASED AUTHENTICATED
KEY AGREEMENT SCHEME
This section presents the proposed authentication and key
establishment protocol. Before describing the protocol, we first
provide a brief introduction to PUFs that form one of its key
components.
A PUF is a one-way function that is embedded into the
hardware components of a physical circuit [13]. The output of
a PUF is dependent on the small inherent random variations
in the dimensions and composition of hardware components
introduced by the chip manufacturing process. When queried
with a challenge x, a PUF produces a response y ⇐ PUF(x)
that depends on x and the internal physical (sub-)microscopic
structure of the device. Due to variations in environmental
and operational factors such as the ambient temperature and
terminal voltages, the PUF output may vary slightly when
queried with the same challenge multiple times. However,
fuzzy extractors can be used to eliminate these variations
(noise) and convert them into deterministic functions [23-25].
A PUF can be used as a tool for hardware authentication
and generating secure keys, among others. Robustness against
physical and invasive attacks, and the ability to retain keys
without actually storing them, makes PUFs ideal candidates
for IoT security. A PUF can be of several types, e.g., delay-
based PUFs which leverage the variation among circuit delays,
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Figure 1. System model for the proposed scheme.
and memory based PUFs which exploit the random process
variations in the memory cells.
There are two phases in the proposed scheme: the regis-
tration phase and the authentication phase. In the registration
phase, each UAV needs to request the USP for registration.
After a UAV successfully registers itself with the USP, it
is provided with a set of secret credentials. These secret
credentials are used by the USP to authenticate the UAV during
subsequent authentication attempts (e.g., when the UAV needs
to authenticate itself before sending data to the USP). If the
authentication is successful, then the UAV will be able to
securely transfer the field information to the USP via a third-
party MEC service provider.
A. Assumptions
• Each UAV is embedded with two PUFs. The first one
is directly embedded in the memory of the UAV, where
recorded field information is stored. The second one is
embedded with the main control circuit of the UAV.
• An adversary is not able to tamper with UAV’s PUFs.
Moreover, any such attempt will make the PUFs useless
[13] and the USP will be detect that through the execution
of our proposed authentication scheme.
• The PUFs used in the proposed scheme are in ideal-state.
Thus, there is no issue of noise in the response from a
PUF.
B. Registration Phase
For the one-time, initial registration process of the proposed
scheme, the UAV and USP need to execute the following steps:
1) Step R1: The UAV sends its identity IDu to the USP
for service registration through a secure channel.
2) Step R2: The USP generates a challenge Ci for use in
the i-th round of authentication (i.e., the i-th execution
of the authentication phase) and sends it to the UAV.
The USP also generates a set of challenges Csyn =
{c1 , · · · , cn} and sends them to the UAV. This set of
challenges is used for addressing desynchronization or
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
3) Step R3: The UAV uses its two PUFs (Pxu ,P
y
u ) and













u (Csyn) and sub-






syn)} to the USP
through the secure channel.
4) Step R4: Next, the USP generates a unique
pseudo identity PID iu and a set of fake identities
FID = {fid1, · · · , fidn} and sends them to
the UAV. Finally, the USP needs to store









for each UAV. On the other hand, the UAV needs to
store only {(PID iu ,FID)}.
Note that the requirement for a secure channel for the UAVs
is only for the initial registration phase and this is not required
for the subsequent authentication phases.
C. Authentication Phase
Consider an UAV that has been assigned to collect field
information from a particular region. In each region, a MEC
operator selected by the USP helps the UAV in transfer-
ring/receiving packets. In this phase of the proposed scheme,
both the UAV and USP authenticate each other and establish
a session key for secure communication. In this regard, the
MEC operator helps them in exchanging the communication
messages. The detailed description of the phase is as follows:
1) Step AU1: The UAV initiates the authentication process
with a “Hello” message to the MEC operator. Upon
receiving the “Hello” message from the UAV, the MEC
operator responds with an acknowledgment (Ack) and
its identity IDMEC .
2) Step AU2: Next, the UAV generates a random number
Nu and then submits its current pseudo identity PID
i
u ,
Nu , and the identity of the MEC operator IDMEC to the
USP via the MEC operator.
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Figure 2. Proposed double-PUF-based privacy preserving authenticated key agreement scheme.
3) Step AU3: Upon receiving the authentication request,
the USP first locates the pseudo identity PID iu in
its records and subsequently selects the challenge-




i ), from its database. Next,
the USP generates a nonce Ns , a unique pseudo iden-
tity for the (i+1)-th round PID i+1u , and subsequently,
calculates PID∗ = PID i+1u ⊕ R
x
i and ResServ =
h(Ryi ||PID
∗||Nu). Hereafter, the USP composes a re-
sponse message M4 : {PID
∗,Ns ,Ci ,ResServ} and
sends M4 to the UAV via the MEC operator.
4) Step AU4: After receiving {PID∗,Ns ,Ci ,ResServ},







u (Ci) and then computes and veri-
fies the hash-response ResServ . If the verification is
unsuccessful, the UAV aborts the execution of the
protocol. Otherwise, the UAV derives PID i+1u =











u (Ci+1 ), EL = LAIu ⊕ h(R
x
i ||Ns),
Rx∗i+1 = h(IDu ||R
x













i ||Ns) and ResUav =
h(EL||Rx∗i+1 ||R
y∗
i+1 ||SK ). The UAV then composes a




i+1 ,ResUav ,EL} and sends M5
to the USP via the MEC operator.
5) Step AU5: Upon receiving the response message M5,





and then checks the response parameter ResUav . If the
verification is successful, then the USP decodes LAIu =
EL ⊕ h(Rxi ||Ns) and validates LAIu with the location
of the MEC operator IDMEC . After successful valida-









i+1 , and R
y















Note that for addressing DoS or synchronization attacks,
the proposed scheme utilizes the concept of synchronous




syn) and the set of
fake identities FID = {fid1, · · · , fidn}. Consider the cases
where the USP cannot identify the pseudo identity PID iu of the
UAV or where the UAV fails to receive any response message
with the parameters {PID∗,Ns ,Ci ,ResServ}. In these cases,
the UAV needs to choose an unused fake identity fidj from the
set of fake identities, i.e., FID, and the USP needs to select









syn). Once both the UAV
and the USP mutually authenticate each other by using the
fake identity fidj and unused synchronous challenge-response









from its database and both the UAV and the USP delete
the fake identity fidj from their memory. Details of the
authentication phase are shown in Figure 2.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we formally analyze the semantic security of
the proposed protocol using the real-or-random (RoR) model
[14]. The RoR security is commonly used to measure the
indistinguishability of session keys. Here, we first demonstrate
that the proposed scheme can accomplish mutual authentica-
tion along with the session key security. Then, we provide the
informal security analysis of the proposed protocol.
A. Formal Security Analysis Using RoR Model
According to the RoR model, an attacker A interacts
with the t-th participant instance Πt. Following the proposed
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scheme, we define the UAV’s and the USP’s instances by
U and S, receptively. The RoR model uses Execute, Send,
Reveal, CorruptDevice, and Test queries to simulate an attack
scenario (as shown in Table II). In our proof, we use a
collision resistant one-way hash function h(·) (a pseudo-
random function), and a secure ideal PUF function P as
random oracles.
B. Assumptions
The security proof makes the following assumptions:
(i) Uncloneability assumption: We can define a PUF as PUF:
{0, 1}l1 → {0, 1}l2 , where for a given input of length l1 the
PUF outputs an arbitary string of length l2 . We can determine
the security of this function with the help of the following
challenge-response game, which consists of two phases:
Phase1: For a given challenge Ci , an adversary A obtains
the PUF response/output Ri .
Challenge: Next, A selects another arbitary challenge Cy
that has not been queried before.
Phase 2: A is allowed to query the PUF for any challenge
other than Cy .
Response: Finally, A outputs its guess for R
′
y for the PUF’s
response Ry to Cy (i.e., Ry = PUF (Cy)).
We say A wins the game if R
′
y = Ry . Therefore, we can
say Adv
puf







(ii)Pseudo random function assumption: A pseudo random
function PRF:{0, 1}k×{0, 1}∗→{0, 1}k
′
which takes a secret
security parameter K ǫ{0, 1}k and a message Mǫ{0, 1}∗ as
input and provides an arbitrary string PRF(K , M) which
is indistinguishable from random string. Now, assuming that
h be a polynomial-time computable pseudorandom function.
For distinguishing h, a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT)
adversary A may request polynomial bounded queries with
its selected inputs and obtain the outputs computed by h for
training. After the training phase, A is given a function, which
is either h or a truly random function. We say that h is a
pseudo-random function, if it is indistinguishable from a truly
random function under A . Namely, A is given either h or a
truly random function according to a random bit {0, 1} and it
has only the probability 1
2
+ ε, to distinguish h.
Theorem 1: Let A be a polynomial time adversary running
in time t against the protocol P . Then, the advantage of A
in breaking the semantic security of the proposed authenti-











where qh , qP , and qsend denote the number of hash, PUF,
and Send queries, respectively. Also, |Hash|, |PUF |, and |D|
denote the length of the hash output, length of the PUF-based
output strings, and the length of the output of an algorithm that
resolves a particular problem by running A on a simulation
protocol, respectively.
Proof. Consider a sequence of games denoted by Gi , where
i = 0, 1, · · · , 4. Let SuccGiA denote the event that A correctly
guesses the random bit c in game Gi . The advantage of





. The proof, following the model in
[14], consists of a sequence of games, starting with the real
attack (executed in G0 ) against the proposed AKE scheme
and ending the game in which the adversary’s advantage is 0,
and for which we can bound the difference in the adversary’s
advantage between any two consecutive games. For each game
Gi , we define an event Adv
AKE
A,Gi
corresponding to the case in
which the adversary correctly guesses the hidden bit c involved
in the Test queries.
Game G0 : It is simulated as an actual attack by A against
the proposed solution in the RoR model. Since the bit c was






Game G1 : This game is modeled as an eavesdropping
attack in which the adversary A intercepts the transmit-
ted messages (such as M3 : {PID
i
u ,Nu , IDmec}, M4 :





ing the authentication phase. Under this game, A invokes
the Execute query. After that, A makes the Reveal and Test
queries to verify whether it is the real session key SK or
a random number derived between the UAV and the USP.
In the proposed AKE scheme, SK is computed as SK =
h(Rxi ||R
y
i ||Nu ||Ns). Thus, A needs to know the secret PUF
responses (Rxi ,R
y
i ) to compute the session key SK correctly.
Eavesdropped messages do not help to increase the adversary’s
winning probability for the game G1 . Therefore, G1 and G0





Game G2 : This game simulates an active attack by hash
queries. Now, A needs to find a message digest collision
in order to deceive a participant and this may be done by
using multiple hash queries. However, it should be noted
that all the imperative transmitted messages such as M4 :





protected by using the secret PUF responses (Rxi ,R
y
i ). Hence,
the games G2 and G1 are indistinguishable. Here, it is assumed
that the collision probability of the hash function is negligible
when A sends several Send(Pt ,Msg) queries. Thus, from











Game G3 : The difference between G2 and G3 is that
simulations of the Send and PUF queries are included in G3 .
In the proposed scheme, we assume that the PUFs used in the
UAVs are secure as defined in Section V-B. Therefore, as in










Game G4 : In this game, the simulation CorruptDevice
is included. In this context, the adversary can obtain the












,M) It is modeled as an active attack where A can send message M to
∏t






) A obtains the session key SK established between
∏t
and its partner using this query.
CorruptDevice (
∏t






for session key SK and receives a probabilistic output based on an unbiased coin or
hidden bit c: (i) if SK is fresh and c = 1,
∏t
returns SK , (ii) if SK is fresh and c = 0,
∏t
delivers
a random number, and (iii) otherwise
∏t
delivers null (⊥).
information {PID iu ,FID}, stored in the UAV Ui . In the
proposed scheme, an UAV is not requires to store any secret
information (such as keys) in its memory. Hence, A cannot
obtain any secret information using CorruptDevice. Therefore,
A cannot gain any additional advantages by simulating this
game. Now, an algorithm D can be constructed after solving
CorruptDevice by running A on simulation of the protocol.
Accordingly, G3 and G4 are indistinguishable. Therefore, we














After all the games are executed, A tries to guess c to win































































































C. Informal Security Analysis
In this subsection, we present a discussion on the robustness
of the proposed protocol against different attacks. The detailed
description of the informal security analysis is given below.
1) Mutual Authentication: In our proposed protocol, both
the UAV and the service provider (USP) can authen-
ticate each other. The USP authenticates the UAV by
checking the parameter ResUav , which must be equal to
h(EL||Rx∗i+1 ||R
y∗





Now, if an adversary A wants to impersonate as an UAV,
then he/she needs to know the secret PUF responses, i.e., Rxi
and R
y
i , which are unavailable to him/her. On the other hand,
the UAV authenticates the USP by evaluating the parameter




if the adversary A wants to impersonate as a USP, then
he/she needs to know the secret PUF response R
y
i , which
is unavailable to him/her. As a result, the proposed scheme
ensures mutual authentication and achieves security against
impersonation attacks.
2) Resistance Against Tracking and Eavesdropping Attacks:
An authentication protocol is said to be vulnerable against
tracking and eavesdropping attacks if an adversary A can
easily listen to the communication messages over a public
channel and can retrieve any useful information from them.
In the proposed protocol, each message is refreshed after
every session which makes the adversary unable to extract
any kind of useful information. For instance, in the proposed
scheme, none of the parameters are allowed to be sent twice.
Therefore, our designed protocol can withstand tracking and
eavesdropping attacks.
3) Anonymity of UAVs: In the proposed scheme,
the MEC is a third-party communication/computing
service provider. When the MEC operator
receives M4 : {PID





i+1 ,ResUav ,EL} from the USP and the
UAV, respectively, then it may try to establish the identity of
the UAV. However, each parameter in M4 and M5 is allowed
to be sent only once. Hence, the MEC operator cannot identify
the UAV. It should be noted that in the proposed scheme, for
any two consecutive sessions i and i+1, PID iu 6= PID
i+1
u .
Thus, it is difficult for an adversary to identify a particular
UAV and this forms the basis for the proposed protocol’s
robustness against attacks on UAV anonymity.
4) Security Against Physical Attacks: In many application
scenarios for UAVs, the drones collect important and sensitive
information from the deployed environment and sends this
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Table III
SECURITY FEATURE’S COMPARISON OF PROPOSED SCHEME WITH RESPECT TO TIAN ET AL.’S SCHEME[15]
Security Features Tian et al. [15] Zhang et al. [16] Srinivas et al. [17] Proposed Scheme
Mutual Authentication Yes No Yes Yes
Anonymity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security Against Forgery Attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Threat No No No Yes
Req. of Clock Synchronization Yes Yes Yes No
Physical Security of the UAV No No No Yes
Table IV
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BASED ON COMPUTATION, COMMUNICATION, AND STORAGE COST
Cost Tian et al. [15] Proposed Scheme
Computation Cost at UAV Etm + Eta + Eth ≃ 33.77 ms 2Etp + 6Eth ≃ 4.76 ms
Computation Cost at USP Etse + Etm + 2Eth ≃ 17.96 ms 7Eth ≃ 0.20 ms
Communication Cost 916 bytes 224 bytes
Storage Cost at the UAV 296 bytes 96 bytes
information to the control center. To ensure privacy of the data,
some applications may require the drone to encrypt the data
by using a secret key (stored in drone’s memory). However, a
drone may experience a range of natural or adversarial condi-
tions which can compromise it physical security. For example,
an UAV may be involved in an accident or component failure
which leads to a crash and the drone may eventually be found
by the adversary. Similarly, an adversary may shoot down
the UAV and physically capture it. An adversary can then
obtain the secret key from the memory of the drone, and
thus gain access to the encrypted data stored in the UAV.
In the proposed scheme, an UAV does not store any secret
keys in its memory. Therefore, even if an adversary physically
captures the drone, he/she cannot get any secrets from the
UAV’s memory. Besides, if the adversary attempts to do any
physical tampering on the drone’s hardware, then the behavior
of the PUFs will be changed and they will not generate the
intended response. Therefore, the USP will be able to reject
authentication attempts by UAVs with tampered hardware and
the proposed protocol can ensure security against physical
attacks on UAVs. In addition, since PUFs also provide the
properly of uncloneability, the adversary cannot create a copy
of the PUFs attached with the UAV.
5) Security Against Location Threats: In real-time appli-
cations with UAVs, an absence of the ability to track the
location of the UAVs may allow an attacker to send incorrect
location information regarding the UAVs to the USP by using
spoofed/false signals. As described in our system model, a
MEC operator may do the same in order get more service
charge from the USP. However, in our proposed scheme,
the USP can identify the UAV’s exact location by using the
parameter LAIu . In order to obtain this parameter, the USP
needs to use the PUF response Rxi and the random number
Ns , i.e., LAIu = EL ⊕ h(R
x
i ||Ns) and after decoding LAIu
from EL, the USP checks this LAIu with the location of the
MEC operator IDMEC . In this way, the USP can keep track
of the current location of the UAV and address any disputes
with the MEC operator regarding the UAV’s location.
6) No Requirement of Clock Synchronization: In general,
to protect against replay attacks, most of the existing proto-
cols in the literature use the concept of timestamps. In this
approach, it is important for the participants of the protocol to
synchronize their clocks. However, there is no need for clock
synchronization in the proposed protocol. This is because in
every session, specific random numbers are being used instead
of timestamps.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first compare the performance of the
proposed scheme with that of three recently proposed IoD-
based authentication schemes ([15], [16], and [17]) from
the perspective of various security features. Subsequently, to
ensure a fair comparison, we compare the proposed protocol
with the scheme presented in [15] in terms of the execution
time, computation overhead, and communication overhead.
The protocol from [15] is chosen for this comparison because
it uses the same underlying MEC-based environment as the
proposed protocol. In contrast, [16] and [17] are primarily
two-party-based authentication schemes.
A. Security Functionality
Table III shows the security capabilities of the proposed
protocol as compared to the protocols presented in [15], [16],
and [17]. As discussed in Section II, the protocol presented in
[16] is vulnerable to forgery attacks, and hence it cannot ensure
mutual authentication. In general, to keep the latency low and
ensure seamless services, the MEC operator supports the UAVs
by using computational infrastructure positioned close to the
wireless infrastructure. However, in the protocol presented in
[15], if a MEC node sends false signals (e.g., in terms of
its location) to an UAV, there is no way to detect that. In
contrast, the proposed protocol can easily detect such attempts
by using the parameter LAIu . Next, in the protocols proposed
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in [15], [16], and [17], the UAV needs to store all the secret
information (e.g., keys) in its memory. Thus, if an adversary
obtains physical access to the drone, it can obtain the secret
key from the memory of the UAV or change the settings of
the UAV. Then, if the adversary uses this compromised UAV
to send false information or manipulated information to the
USP, the USP will not be able detect such attacks. Therefore,
the protocols presented in [15], [16], and [17], cannot ensure
security against physical attacks. Finally, unlike [15], [16], and
[17], the proposed scheme does not use any timestamps to
ensure security against replay attacks.
B. Computation Cost
We compare the computation cost by evaluating the overall
execution time (in milliseconds) required by the cryptographic
operations performed in Tian et al.’s protocol [15] and in the
proposed scheme (since both of these schemes are based on
MEC-enabled scenarios). The basic cryptographic operations
used for computing the execution time are hash operation, si-
multaneous exponentiation operation, modular multiplication,
modular addition, and PUF operation, and the expected time
to execute them are denoted by Eth , Etse , Etm , Eta , and Etp ,
respectively. All the cryptographic operations (corresponding
to Eth , Etm , Etse , Eta , and Etp ) used on the UAV side
are implemented on a ATMel ATMega2560 machine with
a MSP430 micro-controller , while the operations used at
server side (USP) are implemented on a desktop computer
with Intel Core i7 processor with 16 GB RAM. For evaluating
the execution time of these crypto-operations, we utilized the
Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) library. We consider SHA-
256 for hash operation, and for PUF operation, we consider a
128-bit arbiter PUF circuit. The PUF operation is conducted
on the ATMel ATMega2560 machine. The values of Eth , Etm ,
Etse , and Eta at the USP are 0.029 ms, 13.7 ms, 4.26 ms, and
2.68 ms, respectively. Similarly, the values of Eth , Etm , Etse ,
Eta , and Etp at the UAV are 0.37 ms, 27.84 ms, 8.26 ms,
5.93 ms, and 1.27 ms, respectively. Based on these values, the
time taken to execute the proposed protocol’s operations at the
UAV is 2Etp + 6Eth = 4.76 ms, which is significantly lower
than that required by Tian et al.’s scheme (33.77 ms). The
detailed analysis of the computation time is given in Table 4.
From Table 4 we can see that our entire authentication process
takes 4.96 ms of computation time. In comparison, the entire
authentication process in [15] takes 51.73 ms of computation
time. Figure 3 shows that the performance of the proposed
scheme in terms of computational overhead is significantly
lower than that of Tian et al.’s scheme [15].
C. Other Costs
We now compare the communication and storage cost of
the proposed protocols with that of Tian et al.’s scheme [15].
The communication cost of Tian et al.’s scheme is 916 bytes,
whereas the communication cost of the proposed scheme is
224 bytes, which is significantly lower. In terms of storage
cost, in Tian et al.’s scheme, an UAV needs to store 296 bytes
of secret information. In comparison, in the proposed scheme
an UAV needs to store {(PID iu ,FID)} that requires 128+n×
Figure 3. Authentication time as a function of the number of UAVs.
128 bits, where the maximum value of n is chosen to be 5. In
that case, the storage cost of the proposed scheme at an UAV
is only 96 bytes, which is significantly lower than than of [15].
Thus, we can conclude that the proposed protocol is efficient
in term of storage and communication costs while providing
reliable security features.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Small-scale unmanned aerial vehicles have attracted increas-
ing attention from both industry and academia due to their
capability to assist a wide spectrum of applications, ranging
from package delivery to surveillance. Similar to vehicular ad
hoc networks (VANETs), edge assisted UAVs is a promising
approach to provide connectivity, enhance flying safety, and
ensure service quality of UAVs. However, connecting UAVs
through third-party edge devices also brings security and
privacy risks due to the open-access communication environ-
ment. In this paper, we proposed an efficient authenticated
key agreement scheme for edge-assisted UAV environments.
The proposed protocol utilizes computationally inexpensive
cryptographic functions such as PUFs and hash operations.
We have critically verified and evaluated the proposed protocol
with the help of formal and informal security analysis in order
to show its adequacy, security, and robustness. The informal
security analysis shows that the proposed protocol has the
ability to resist major security attacks. Moreover, we compared
our protocol with a recently proposed protocol in terms of their
performance and overhead. The performance analysis shows
that our protocol is secure, efficient and agile as compared to
the related protocol.
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